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David G. Duff*
(July 1, 2019)
Introduction
Among the ways in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) can shift profits from one
jurisdiction to another in order to minimize taxes, one of the most simple and widely-employed
involves the payment of interest to related parties and third parties. Since interest is generally
deductible to the payer and included in computing the recipient’s income,1 related-party debt
can be used to increase deductible interest expenses in relatively high-tax jurisdictions with
corresponding income inclusions in relatively low-tax jurisdictions.2 Where a jurisdiction
exempts or defers the taxation of income from foreign affiliates, moreover, interest on relatedor third-party debt that is used to finance the production of this income can reduce the
borrower’s taxable income without a corresponding income inclusion. For these reasons, it is
not surprising that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Action Plan
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) identified the deduction of interest and other

*

Professor and Director of the Tax LLM Program, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British
Columbia.
1
This discussion assumes that interest payments will continue to be deductible to the payer and
included in computing the recipient’s income for the foreseeable future. According to a recent study,
most countries tax debt and equity differently, allowing a deduction for interest expense and including
interest income at ordinary rates, while denying any deduction for dividends paid and typically granting
relief for dividends received in the form of an exemption, exclusion or credit. James Gadwood and Paul
Morton, “Interest deductibility: the implementation of BEPS Action 4: General Report" Subject 1, Cahiers
de Droit Fiscal International, vol. 104A (Rotterdam: International Fiscal Association, 2019) 9-44 at 20.
2
Although the text refers to relatively high- and low-tax “jurisdictions”, it is more accurate to refer to
entities that are subject to relatively high or low rates of taxation, which may depend on special rules
rather than general tax rates. For simplicity, however, I refer here to relatively high-tax jurisdictions and
relatively low-tax jurisdictions.
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financial payments as a significant source of BEPS concerns,3 and that BEPS Action 4 was
charged with developing “recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules to
prevent base erosion through the use of interest expense … and other financial payments that
are economically equivalent to interest payments.”4
Although the OECD released its Final Report on BEPS Action 4 in October 20155 and an
update on this Report in December 2016,6 Canada has yet to indicate whether it will take any
action to implement any of the best practices recommended in these Reports.7 In the
meantime, several jurisdictions, including the United States, have implemented measures that
are broadly consistent with the OECD’s “recommended approach” to introduce a “fixed ratio
rule” limiting an entity’s net deductions for interest (and payments economically equivalent to
interest) to 10% to 30% of the entity’s earnings either before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA).8 At the same time, corporate tax rate reductions in the United States

3

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting, (Paris: OECD, 2013) at 16 [hereafter BEPS Action Plan].
4
Ibid. at 17. In general, references to in this article to “interest” include references to payments that are
economically equivalent to interest.
5
OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 –
2015 Final Report, (Paris: OECD, 2015) [hereafter Final Report on BEPS Action 4].
6
OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 –
2016 Update, (Paris: OECD, 2016) [hereafter BEPS Action 4 Update].
7
This is in notable contrast to the federal government’s recent ratification of the Multilateral
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, which implements various
treaty-related measures under other BEPS action plans, including in particular BEPS Action 6 on tax
treaty abuse.
8
See Final Report on BEPS Action 4, supra note 5 at 11; and BEPS Action 4 Update, supra note 6 at 13.
For a recent summary of developments in other jurisdictions, see Gadwood and Morton, supra note 1.
For explanations of the U.S. rules in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), see Peter Harris, Michael Keen and
Li Liu, “Policy Forum: International Effects of the 2017 US Tax Reform – A View from the Front Line”
(2019) 67:1 Can. Tax J. 27-39; Ken McKenzie and Michael Smart, “Policy Forum: Business Tax Reform in
the United States and Canada” (2019) 67:1 Can. Tax J. 57-66; and Ken McKenzie and Michael Smart, Tax
Policy Next to the Elephant: Business tax Reform in the Wake of the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
Commentary No. 537, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, March 2019). For discussions of the UK rules, see
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and the United Kingdom increase the risk of profit shifting out of Canada, making it advisable
for Canada to reconsider its rules for the deduction of interest expenses and other base eroding
payments.9
This article considers how Canada should respond to the recommendations of BEPS
Action 4 in light of recent developments in the U.S. and other jurisdictions. The first section
explains the ways in which interest payments may be used to shift profits from one jurisdiction
to another in order to minimize taxes, considering both inbound investments and outbound
investments, and why this base erosion and profit shifting may be problematic as a matter of
tax policy. The second section reviews Canadian responses to these profit shifting strategies
prior to BEPS Action 4. The third section summarizes the recommendations of BEPS Action 4
and the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented in other countries. A
final section concludes by considering how Canada should respond to BEPS Action 4 in light of
recent developments in other countries.
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting through the Deduction of Interest Expenses
As the BEPS Action Plan explains, the deductibility of interest expenses can give rise to
base erosion and profit shifting in the context of inbound investments and outbound

Richard Collier, Michael Devereux and Strahil Lepoev, “Proposed UK Changes on the Tax Deductibility of
Corporate Interest Expense” [2017] British Tax Review 60-79; Daniel Head and Kashif Javed, How to
handle the new corporate interest restriction” Tax Journal (27 October 2017) 10-15; and Antony Ting,
“Creating Interest Expense Out of Nothing at All – Policy Options to Cap Deductions to ‘Real’ Interest
Expense” [2018] British Tax Review 589-605. See also the discussion of the interest limitation rule in the
EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), in Ana Paula Dourado, “The Interest Limitation Rule in the AntiTax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and the Net Taxation Principle” (2017), 26:3 EC Tax Review 112-121.
9
See, e.g., Harris, et. al., supra note 8 at 36-37; McKenzie and Smart, Tax Policy Next to the Elephant,
supra note 8 at 8.
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investments.10 From an inbound perspective, the risk of BEPS relates primarily to lending from
an entity that is subject to little or no tax in one jurisdiction to a related entity that is subject to
a relatively high rate of tax in another jurisdiction. Since the distinction between debt and
equity makes little economic difference to related entities, it is relatively easily for these
entities to convert what might otherwise be non-deductible dividend payments into deductible
interest payments by reducing the equity element of an investment and increasing the amount
of debt (thin capitalization). Where the amount of the debt exceeds the amount that the
borrower could obtain from an arm’s length party, it is arguable that the excess debt should be
regarded as equity and the interest paid on this excess debt should be characterized as a
distribution. Where the debt exceeds the group’s third-party debt, moreover, a strong case can
be made that the loan results in unacceptable base erosion and profit shifting.
From an outbound perspective, the risk of BEPS involves the use of related- or thirdparty debt by an entity that is subject to a relatively high rate of tax in order to finance the
production of income by a related entity that is subject to little or no tax in another jurisdiction,
which can be is distributed to the first entity in the form of exempt or deferred dividends. To
the extent that the interest on the debt is currently deductible by the borrowing entity while
the dividends that it receives from the related entity are either exempt from tax or taxable on a
deferred basis when received, the interest expense can be used to shelter other income from
tax in the first jurisdiction, thereby eroding its tax base. Since the debt finances the production
of income by a related entity in another jurisdiction, moreover, the arrangement effectively
shifts profits to this other jurisdiction.

10

BEPS Action Plan, supra note 3 at 16.
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Although generally viewed as wholly separate issues, the distinction between these
BEPS risks can break down when one takes the perspective of a multinational group with
entities in multiple jurisdictions subject to different rates of tax. As Michael Graetz
demonstrates in a stylized example involving a multinational group with entities in three
jurisdictions, the ability of the group to locate debt and equity in the jurisdictions from which it
obtains the greatest overall tax advantage means that the location of a debt in one jurisdiction
in order to finance an equity investment in another jurisdiction can simultaneously be viewed
as an instance of outbound BEPS and an example of inbound BEPS attributable to thin
capitalization.11 From this perspective, it follows that a principled response to the use of
related- and third-party debt for BEPS purposes is to allocate the group’s net third-party
interest expense among the members of the group based on their share of the assets or income
of the group as a whole.12
From a tax policy perspective, the use of interest deductions for BEPS purposes may be
questioned on several grounds.13 Beginning with equity or fairness, the opportunity to reduce
taxes through the deduction of interest expenses on inbound and outbound investments
creates a competitive advantage for groups operating internationally over those operating
11

Michael J. Graetz, “A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses” (2008),
62 Bulletin for International Taxation 486-493 at 488, concluding that “economically similar transactions
will fit into different traditional analytic boxes depending on which country is examining the transaction
and where the borrowing takes place.” The connection between inbound and outbound aspects of
interest deductibility is particularly clear in the context of so-called “debt dumping” in which a foreign
controlled entity borrows funds in order to finance an equity investment in a related entity in another
jurisdiction.
12
Ibid., preferring allocation by assets over allocation by income as “conceptually more sound” and
“probably easier to implement.” See also Choe Burnett, “Intra-Group Debt at the Crossroads: StandAlone versus Worldwide Approach” (2014), 6 World Tax Journal 40-76; J. Vleggeert, “Interest Deduction
Based on the Allocation of Worldwide Debt” (2014), 68(2) Bulletin for International Taxation 103-107;
and Ting, supra note 8.
13
See, e.g., Final Report on BEPS Action 4, supra note 5 at 15-16.
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exclusively in a domestic market. From an efficiency perspective, this form of BEPS undermines
capital ownership neutrality, creating a tax preference for assets to be held by multinational
groups instead of domestic enterprises. It also creates a tax-induced bias in the cross-border
context towards debt financing, accentuating an already existing tax bias toward debt finance
under most income taxes, due to the different tax treatment of returns to debt and equity.
Finally, the use of interest deductions for BEPS purposes reduces government revenues, which
can have other distributional and efficiency implications to the extent that reduced revenues
lower government expenditures or are offset through other taxes.14 For these reasons, it is not
surprising that countries have adopted various approaches to limit opportunities for BEPS
through the deduction of interest expenses, nor that the OECD decided to address this form of
base erosion and profit shifting in BEPS Action 4.
Canadian Limits on the Deduction of Interest Expenses Prior to BEPS Action 4
Although Canada has yet to indicate whether it will implement any of the best practices
recommended in the Final Report on BEPS Action 4, it has several rules that limit the deduction
of interest expenses for international tax planning, including in particular thin capitalization
rules for inbound investments by specified non-residents and foreign affiliate dumping rules for
outbound investments by Canadian resident corporations that are controlled by non-resident
corporations.15 Before turning to the recommendations of BEPS Action 4, this section reviews

14

Graetz, supra note 11 at 488.
For a recent overview of these and other Canadian rules affecting the deduction of interest expense in
the international context, see Amanda Heale and John Leopardi, “Canada” in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal
International, vol. 104A (Rotterdam: International Fiscal Association, 2019) 191-209.
15
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Canadian experience with rules limiting the deduction of interest expenses on inbound and
outbound investments.16
Interest on debt-financed inbound investments
Canada was one of the first countries in the world to enact thin capitalization rules for
inbound investments, which were introduced in 1972.17 Although originally applicable only to
resident corporations, the rules were recently broadened to include resident trusts,
partnerships of which a resident corporation or trust is a partner, and branches of non-resident
corporations and trusts operating in Canada.18
Unlike thin capitalization rules in several countries which apply only where a resident
borrower is controlled by a non-resident lender, the Canadian rules apply at a lower threshold,
where the non-resident lender and non-arm’s length persons own at least 25% of the resident
corporation’s shares by votes or value or 25% of the fair market value of all beneficial interests
in the trust.19 In these circumstances, the rules disallow the deduction of otherwise deductible
interest expenses on “outstanding debts to specified non-residents” to the extent that these
debts exceed 1.5 times the “equity amount” of the corporation or trust.20 Where the borrower

16

The discussion below is based on David G. Duff, “Action 4 of the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting Initiative: Interest and Base-Eroding Payments – Insights from Canadian Experience”
(2015) 69 Bulletin for International Taxation 350-354 at 351-354.
17
Department of Finance, Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1997) at 6.26 [hereafter Report of the Technical Committee].
18
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 18(4) [hereafter “ITA”].
19
Ibid., definitions of “specified shareholder” and “specified beneficiary” in s. 18(5)
20
Ibid., definitions of “outstanding debts to specified non-residents” and “equity amount”. In general,
the equity amount of a corporation is the total of all retained earnings of the corporation at the
beginning of the year, the average of the corporation’s contributed surplus in the year to the extent that
it was contributed by a specified non-resident shareholder, and the average of the corporation’s paid-up
capital in the year excluding the paid-up capital in respect of shares owned by a person other than a
specified non-resident shareholder, and the equity amount of a trust is the sum of its tax-paid earnings
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is a corporation or partnership of which a corporation is a member, the disallowed interest
expense is deemed to be a dividend.21 Where the borrower is a trust or a partnership of which
a trust is a member, the trust may designate the disallowed interest expense as a payment of
trust income to the non-resident beneficiary.22
While these thin capitalization rules apply to back-to-back loans, they do not otherwise
apply to arm’s length debt, even if guaranteed by a specified non-resident shareholder or
beneficiary. To the extent that guaranteed debt is easily substituted for non-arm’s length debt,
this would appear to be a serious deficiency in the Canadian rules.23 Notwithstanding this
concern, both the 1997 Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation and the 2008
Report of the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation questioned
extension of the thin-capitalization rules to debt guaranteed by specified non-residents on the
grounds that this could “disrupt normal commercial financing arrangements”24 and “increase
the complexity of the current system and compliance burden of business.”25 Although the
federal government proposed to extend the thin capitalization rules to guaranteed debt in the
2000 Federal Budget,26 it withdrew the proposal in the face of considerable criticism.27

and contributions to the trust from specified non-resident beneficiaries less capital distributions to
specified non-resident beneficiaries.
21
Ibid., s. 214(16).
22
Ibid., s. 18(5.4). Although the trust may deduct this designated payment in computing its income, the
designated amount is subject to withholding tax under Part XIII and the trust may be subject to tax under
Part XII.2.
23
Brian J. Arnold, Reforming Canada’s International Tax System: Toward Coherence and Simplicity,
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2009) at 308.
24
Report of the Technical Committee, supra note 17 at 6.29.
25
Department of Finance, Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, Final Report,
Enhancing Canada’s International Tax Advantage, (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2008) at para 5.29
[hereafter Report of the Advisory Panel].
26
Hon. Paul Martin, The Budget Plan 2000: Better Finances Better Lives, (February 28, 2000) at 248.

8

If the aim of the thin capitalization rules is to prevent base erosion and profit shifting,
moreover, it is unclear why the rules take into account only debt owed to specified nonresidents and equity (other than retained earnings) contributed by specified non-residents,
rather than all debt and equity of the relevant corporation or trust.28 Although amended rules
might continue to disallow the deduction of interest expenses only on debts owing to specified
non-residents,29 considering all debt and equity would provide a better measure of thin
capitalization.
A further deficiency of Canada’s thin capitalization rules is the inflexibility of a fixed
ratio, particularly when data consistently demonstrates that debt to equity ratios vary widely
among different industries30 as well as among firms within industries.31 While one alternative to
a single fixed ratio would be to adopt different ratios for different industries,32 a more
principled approach would be to apply a debt to equity ratio for each entity in a corporate
group based on the ratio of the group’s external debt to its equity. As explained below, the
Final Report on BEPS Action 4 includes an optional group-ratio rule in addition to a fixed ratio,

27

Department of Finance News Release, “Finance Minister Clarifies Certain Income Tax Measures in the
2000 Budget” (May 9, 2000).
28
Arnold, supra note 23, at 313, arguing that “[f]or the purpose of calculating the amount of a
corporation’s debt and equity, all of its debt and equity should be taken into account”.
29
Ibid.
30
See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Panel, supra note 25 at Table 5.2, reporting average debt to equity
ratios from 2000 to 2005 ranging from 0.17 for insurance carriers and related activities to 3.76 for
utilities. See also Tim Edgar, Jonathan Farrar and Amin Mawani, “Foreign Direct Investment, Thin
Capitalization, and the Interest Expense Deduction: A Policy Analysis” (2008), 56 Canadian Tax Journal
803-869 at Table 2, reporting mean debt to equity ratios from 1996 to 2005 ranging from approximately
0.2 in certain retail sectors to over 2.8 for real estate and over 45 for hotels and motels.
31
See, e.g., Edgar, Farrar and Mawani, supra note 30 at Table 2, reporting standard deviations ranging
from 0.063 for water transportation to approximately 3.5 for real estate and over 5 for hotels and
motels.
32
See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 23, at 313, recommending a higher ratio for financial institutions and
other industries that are typically highly leveraged.
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allowing a taxpayer that would otherwise be subject to the fixed ratio to deduct interest
expenses up to the group ratio.33
Interest on debt-financed outbound investments
Until 1972, Canadian corporations could not deduct interest on borrowed money that
was used to invest in Canadian or foreign subsidiaries.34 Since then, Canada has allowed a
deduction for interest on borrowed funds used to earn dividends, even if these dividends are
effectively exempt from tax as inter-corporate dividends from taxable Canadian corporations or
as exempt dividends from foreign affiliates.35
Under rules enacted in 1972, dividends from a foreign affiliate were originally exempt
only if the affiliate was a resident of a state with which Canada has entered into a tax treaty.36
Although Canada had only 16 tax treaties when these rules were adopted in 1972, this number
increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s and Canada now has over 90 tax treaties. As a
result, what was once predominantly a credit system for dividends from foreign affiliates
gradually morphed into what is predominantly an exemption system.
As this change became apparent in the 1990s, concerns were raised in some quarters
that the deduction of interest expenses on debt used by Canadian corporations to acquire

33

See infra, notes 93-111 and accompanying text. As explained below, however, the OECD’s
recommended approach generally contemplates a group ratio rule based on earnings rather than assets.
34
Report of the Technical Committee, supra note 17 at 6.11.
35
Since the dividends are included in computing the recipient corporation’s income under ITA
subsection 82(1) or 90(1), interest on the borrowed funds is deductible under ITA subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i). To the extent that dividends received are deductible in computing taxable income under ITA
subsection 112(1) or 113(1), however, the dividends are effectively exempt.
36
ITA, s. 113(1)(a) and the definition of “exempt surplus” in s. 5907 of the Income Tax Regulation, CRC,
c. 945, as amended. These rules were amended in 2007 to extend exempt surplus status to foreign
affiliates residing in states with which Canada has entered into a tax information exchange agreement.
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shares of foreign affiliates was eroding the Canadian corporate income tax base.37 In 1998, the
Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation considered the issue in detail,
concluding that Canadian MNEs had “significantly increased” their borrowings in Canada over
the previous years,38 and recommending a tracing rule as the simplest and most familiar way to
restrict the deduction of interest on borrowed funds used to earn exempt dividends.39
Although the Liberal Government of the day did not act on the Technical Committee’s
recommendation, the Conservative Government proposed a broad tracing rule to limit the
deduction of interest expenses on indebtedness incurred to acquire shares of a foreign affiliate
in the 2007 Federal Budget.40 As Brian Arnold relates, however, “[t]he outrage of corporate
Canada was predictable, swift, and effective.”41 A few weeks after the Budget was tabled, the
government quietly withdrew its original proposal, replacing it with a targeted anti-avoidance
rule that would disallow the deduction of interest expenses on borrowed funds used in doubledip financing arrangements in which an interest deduction was also available in another

37

See, e.g., The Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, (Ottawa: Supply and
Services, 1992) at 46-51.
38
Report of the Technical Committee, supra note 17 at 6.12. This finding is consistent with academic
studies cited in the Final Report on BEPS Action 4, supra note 5 at 17, concluding that multinational
groups leverage more debt in subsidiaries located in high tax countries, that thin capitalization is
strongly associated with multinational groups, and that foreign-owned enterprises use more debt than
domestically-owned enterprises.
39
Report of the Technical Committee, supra note 17 at 6.14, recommending a “broadly drafted” rule
that would disallow the deduction of interest on “borrowings that can reasonably be considered, having
regard to all of the circumstances, to have been used to assist, directly or indirectly, another person to
make the foreign direct investment.”
40
Hon. James M. Flaherty, The Budget Plan 2007: Aspire to a Stronger, Safer, Better Canada, (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, March 19, 2007) at 242-243.
41
Arnold, supra note 23, at 118.
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jurisdiction.42 At the same time, the government also announced that it would establish an
expert panel to “undertake further study and consultations, with a view to building on the
measures in the March 2007 budget, and identify additional measures to improve the fairness
and competitiveness of Canada’s system of international taxation.”43
When the Advisory Panel reported in 2008, one of its most pointed recommendations
was that the government should repeal the anti-double dip provision, which it did before the
provision came into effect.44 The Advisory Panel also rejected the idea of “any restrictions on
the deductibility of interest expense incurred by Canadian companies to invest in foreign
affiliates”45 on the following grounds:
Our research shows that many businesses based in other countries can deduct interest
on borrowed money to invest in a foreign company even though dividends from the
foreign company, when repatriated, will be either exempt or mostly free from home
country tax. While some countries have introduced targeted rules aimed at restricting
outbound financing arrangements, many such arrangements are widely available. The
Panel believes that Canada’s tax system should not create disadvantages for Canadian
businesses when they compete abroad.
Canadian businesses need flexibility in raising capital and structuring the financing of
their foreign acquisitions and expansions to be competitive with businesses based in
other countries. In the Panel’s view, this pragmatic concern is of greater weight than the
theoretical basis for denying interest deductions on money borrowed to invest in foreign
companies or in respect of outbound financing arrangements.46

At the same time, the Advisory Panel expressed “significant tax policy concerns”
regarding debt dumping or debt pushdown transactions in which a Canadian corporation

42

Department of Finance, “Canada’s New Government Improves Tax Fairness with Anti-Tax-Haven
Initiative” News Release 2007-041 (14 May 2007). See also the accompanying Backgrounder,
“International Tax Avoidance and ‘Tax Havens’ (14 May 2007).
43
Backgrounder, supra note 42.
44
S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 6(1), repealing ITA, s. 18.2.
45
Report of the Advisory Panel, supra note 25 at para. 4.155.
46
Ibid. at paras. 4.165 and 4.166.
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(CanSub) controlled by a foreign corporation (Parent) uses borrowed funds to acquire shares of
another related foreign corporation (ForSub).47 According to the Report of the Advisory Panel:
Where there is no other connection between the businesses conducted by CanSub and
ForSub and especially where CanSub does not take part in the management of ForSub or
share or benefit from an increase in the value of ForSub’s operations subsequent to
CanSub’s investment, such a transaction has the effect of inappropriately reducing
CanSub’s Canadian tax liability. It permits Parent to leverage its existing Canadian
operations by simply reorganizing the group’s ownership structure. The reorganization
may not have had any purpose other than to shift deductible expenses into Canada. As a
result, the reorganization reduces the Canadian tax base, generates no new economic
activity in Canada, and provides little or no benefit to Canadians.48

For these reasons, the Panel recommended a specific anti-avoidance rule that would either
disallow the deduction of interest expenses paid by a foreign-controlled Canadian corporation
on borrowed funds “used to purchase, directly or indirectly, an equity interest in a related
foreign corporation”; or “apply an appropriate level of Canadian tax to the purchase price paid
by the foreign controlled Canadian corporation in respect of the direct or indirect acquisition of
the equity interest in the related foreign corporation” such as by deeming the purchase price to
be a dividend subject to withholding tax in Canada. 49
Presumably regarding the tracing approach to be complicated and relatively easy for
taxpayers to circumvent, the government settled on the second approach, introducing a
“foreign affiliate dumping” rule in the 2012 Federal Budget.50 Enacted as s. 212.3 of the ITA, this
rule generally applies whenever a corporation resident in Canada (CRIC) acquires shares or debt
of, or contributes capital to, a corporation that either is a foreign affiliate of the CRIC or
becomes a foreign affiliate after this investment, regardless of whether the investment is
47

Ibid. at paras. 5.51 and 5.52.
Ibid. at para. 5.53.
49
Ibid. at para. 5.57.
50
Hon. James M. Flaherty, Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2012: Jogs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity,
(March 29, 2012) at 423-425,
48
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financed by debt or internal funds of the CRIC. In these circumstances, the rule generally deems
the CRIC to have paid and its foreign parent to have received a dividend equal to the amount by
which the amount invested in the foreign affiliate exceeds the equity of the foreign parent in
the CRIC. In this respect, the foreign affiliate dumping provision functions as an anti-surplusstripping rule rather than an interest expense limitation by discouraging debt dumping as well
as other transactions that can be construed as economic substitutes for the distribution of
dividends by the CRIC to its foreign parent.
BEPS Action 4 and the Implementation of Best Practices
Canadian experience with rules limiting the deduction of interest expenses suggests that
it is much easier for countries acting on their own to enact measures preventing base erosion
and profit shifting by non-residents than it is to adopt measures preventing base erosion and
profit shifting by resident MNEs.51 More generally, as the Final Report of BEPS Action 4 explains,
because “a robust approach to restrict interest deductions by a single country could adversely
impact the attractiveness of the country to international business and the ability of domestic
groups to compete globally” it follows that “unilateral action by countries is failing to tackle
some of the issues at the heart of this problem.”52
For this reason, the Report concludes, “a consistent approach utilising international best
practices would be a more effective and efficient way of addressing concerns surrounding the

51

For a similar conclusion, see Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, Aggressive Tax Planning by
Multinational Corporations: The Canadian Context and Possible Responses, University of Calgary School
of Public Policy Research Papers, vol. 7, no. 29 (September 2014) at 26, observing that “historically,
Canada has been vigilant about protecting the Canadian tax base from aggressive tax planning by nonresidents [but] has not been particularly concerned about the erosion of the domestic tax base by
Canadian multinationals.”
52
Final Report on BEPS Action 4, supra note 5 at 17-18.
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use of interest in base erosion and profit shifting.”53 Although this “best practices” approach
does not establish “minimum standards” like those for some other BEPS Actions such as tax
treaty abuse, the OECD expects domestic rules “to converge through the implementation of
agreed common approaches, … enabling further consideration of whether such measures
should become minimum standards.”54 This section reviews the “best practice”
recommendations in BEPS Action 4 and the extent to which recent developments in other
jurisdictions reflect the “convergence” sought by the OECD.
BEPS Action 4 Recommendations
Before turning to its best practices recommendations, the Final Report on BEPS Action 4
begins by reviewing existing approaches to limiting the use of interest expenses for BEPS
purposes, identifying six broad groups:
1. Arm’s length tests, which compare the level of interest or debt in an entity with the
position that would have existed had the entity been dealing entirely with third
parties.
2. Withholding tax on interest payments, which are used to allocate taxing rights to a
source jurisdiction.
3. Rules which disallow a specified percentage of the interest expense of an entity,
irrespective of the nature of the payment or to whom it is made.
4. Rules which limit the level of interest expense or debt in an entity with reference to
a fixed ratio, such as debt/equity, interest/earnings or interest/total assets.
5. Rules which limit the level of interest expense or debt in an entity with reference to
the group’s overall position.
6. Targeted anti-avoidance rules which disallow interest expenses on specific
transactions.55

53

Ibid. at 18.
OECD, Background Brief: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, (January 2017) at 9 [hereafter OECD
Background Brief].
55
Final Report on BEPS Action 4, supra note 5 at 19.
54
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Although the Report notes than an arm’s length test considers “the particular
commercial circumstances of an entity or group” and “recognises that entities may have
different levels of interest expense depending on their circumstances,” it rejects this approach
as a best practice to limit the deduction of interest expenses on the grounds that it is “resource
intensive and time consuming for both taxpayers and tax administrations to apply” and
uncertain in application because “each entity is considered separately after arrangements are
entered into.”56 It also rejects withholding taxes as a best practice to address BEPS-related
interest expenses on the grounds that withholding tax rates would have to match corporate tax
rates to eliminate BEPS opportunities but are generally reduced to much lower levels
(sometimes to zero) under bilateral tax treaties,57 and rejects rules disallowing a specified
percentage of an entity’s interest expense on the basis that these rules do not specifically
target BEPS risks associated with high levels of debt.58 At the same time, it suggests that “these
rules may still have a role to play within a country’s tax system alongside the best practice
approach, either in supporting those rules or in meeting other tax policy goals,”59 concluding on
this basis that countries may “continue to apply an arm’s length test, withholding tax on
interest, or rules to disallow a percentage of an entity’s total interest expense, so long as these
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do not reduce the effectiveness of the best practice approach in tackling base erosion and
profit shifting.”60
In contrast to these rules, the Report bases its best practice approach on “a combination
of some or all of the rules in groups 4 to 6”.61 According to the Report:
A general limit on interest deductions would restrict the ability of an entity to deduct
net interest expense based on a fixed financial ratio. This could be combined with a rule
to allow the entity to deduct more interest up to the group’s equivalent financial ratio
where this is higher…. These general rules should be complemented by targeted rules to
address planning to reduce or avoid the effect of the general rules, and targeted rules
can also be used to tackle specific risks not covered by the general rules. This approach
should provide effective protection for countries against base erosion and profit shifting
involving interest, but should not prevent businesses from raising the debt finance
necessary for their business and commercial investments.62

The following discussion considers each element of this best practices approach,
addressing the rationale for and design of a fixed ratio rule, an optional group ratio rule,
optional rules providing for the carryover of disallowed interest expense and unused
interest capacity, and targeted anti-avoidance rules.
Fixed ratio rule
Although a principled approach to limit the deduction of BEPS-related interest expenses
would allocate the net third-party interest expense of corporate groups among its members
based on their share of the assets or income of the group as a whole,63 the consistent
application of an allocation rule along these lines would require agreement on the definition of
the group to which the rule would apply, on the calculation of the group’s net third party
interest expense, and on the manner in which such expenses would be allocated among
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members of the group.64 As a result, although the Final Report on BEPS Action 4 acknowledges
that worldwide allocation would be an ideal approach,65 it recommends a fixed ratio rule as a
much simpler approach for entities to apply and tax administrations to administer,66 with an
optional group ratio rule as supplementary rule that could permit the deduction of interest
expenses exceeding the fixed ratio.67
While a fixed ratio rule could be based on a ratio debt to equity, as with Canada’s thin
capitalization rules, or on a ratio of interest expense to earnings, the Final Report on BEPS
Action 4 favours the latter approach for several reasons. First, because the use of interest
payments for BEPS purposes depends on the deductible expenses incurred by an entity, a limit
based on a ratio of interest to earnings addresses the risk of BEPS more directly than a limit
based on a ratio of debt to equity.68 Second, since it would be impractical to measure the fair
market value of an entity’s assets in order to determine the value of its equity, a ratio based on
interest to earnings may provide a more accurate measure of an entity’s economic activity than
a ratio based on debt to equity.69 Third, to the extent that an interest to earnings ratio links
allowable interest deductions to taxable income, the rule is more robust against tax planning
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than a debt to equity ratio,70 which may be manipulated by increasing the level of equity in an
entity.71 Fourth, a rule based an interest to earnings ratio can also be easily adapted to exclude
specific categories of income from the definition of earnings, so that the rule limits the
deduction of interest expenses on borrowed funds used to finance tax-exempt and tax-deferred
income.72 Fifth, since the OECD’s best practices approach would also apply to payments such as
guarantee fees, notional interest on derivative instruments and the finance cost element of
finance lease payments,73 an interest to earnings ratio is more amenable to the inclusion of
these payments than a debt to equity ratio for which a corresponding debt may not exist.74
Sixth, while a limit based on a ratio of interest to earnings automatically addresses BEPS risks
resulting from an excessive rate of interest, a limit based on a debt to equity ratio requires an
additional set of rules, such as an arm’s length test, to address these risks.75 Finally, the Report
adds, since the amount of an entity’s debt may vary throughout a taxable period, while interest
expenses automatically reflect changes in borrowings throughout the period, an interest to
earnings ratio provides “a more accurate picture of the entity’s actual taxable position over the
period” than a debt to equity ratio.76 Although the last two reasons seem somewhat overblown
in the Canadian context, given a reasonableness limit on the deduction of interest expenses77
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and an averaging approach for computing debt and equity under the thin capitalization rules,78
the other reasons provide a strong case for a rules based on an interest to earnings ratio as
opposed to a debt to equity ratio.79
Regarding the design of this fixed ratio rule, the Report recommends that it should limit
an entity’s net interest expenses, not gross interest expense,80 that earnings should be defined
as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) less non-taxable
income such as exempt dividends or branch profits subject to a participation exemption,81 and
that the fixed ratio of allowable net interest expenses should fall within a “corridor” of 10% to
30% of EBITDA.82 Although a limit on gross interest expense would be administratively simpler
and more robust to tax planning, a net interest rule would reduce the risk of double taxation
and allow an entity to borrow from third parties and on-lend funds within a group without
limiting its gross income expense.83 Defining earnings as EBITDA is favoured on the grounds that
it is “the most common measure of earnings currently used by countries with earnings-based
tests” and “a measure of earnings which is often used by lenders in deciding how much interest
expense an entity can reasonably afford to bear”84 – though the Report also states that a
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country may chose to adopt earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as an alternative
definition of earnings.85 And the suggested range of 10% to 30% aims to exclude a majority of
multinational groups while limiting opportunities for significant BEPS through the deduction of
interest expenses.86 Given the pragmatic choice of a fixed ratio rule, each of these
recommendations seems reasonable.
As for the scope of the rule, the Report suggest that it should at a minimum apply to all
entities that are part of a multinational group,87 but could also apply to domestic groups and
standalone entities that pose particular BEPS risks.88 Where a rule applies only to multinational
groups, the Report also recommends a targeted rule to prevent BEPS through interest
payments to related parties and third parties under structured arrangements such as back-toback loans.89 Where a group has more than one entity in a particular country, it also suggests
that the ratio should apply to overall position of the domestic group, which would allow a
highly leveraged entity to deduct interest expenses if the net interest to EBITDA ratio of the
domestic group adheres to the fixed ratio.90 The Report also recommends an optional de
minimis monetary threshold to exclude low-risk entities and reduce administration and
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compliance costs.91 It also contemplates an option to exclude certain public benefit projects on
the grounds that the nature of these assets and their close connection with the public sector
mean that they present little or no risk of BEPS.92
Group ratio rule
Although the Final Report on BEPS Action 4 recommends a fixed ratio rule as a simpler
rule for entities to apply and tax administrations to administer,93 it also contemplates an
optional group ratio rule as supplementary rule that could permit the deduction of interest
expenses exceeding the fixed ratio.94 The purpose of this rule is to allow the deduction of
interest expenses incurred by highly leveraged groups where this interest is attributable to
external debt of the group at a whole rather than base erosion and profit shifting.95 By
providing this flexibility for highly leveraged groups, moreover, the Report suggests that the
fixed ratio can be set relatively low, “making sure that the fixed ratio rule is effective in
combating base erosion and profit shifting, while the group ratio rule compensates for the
blunt operation of such a rule.”96
As with a fixed ratio rule, a group ratio rule could be based asset-based or earningsbased, allowing the deduction of net interest expenses above the fixed ratio either where the
entity’s equity to total assets ratio equals or exceeds that of the group (an “equity escape
rule”), or where its net interest to EBITDA ratio does not exceed the net third-party interest
91
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expense to EBITDA ratio of the group as a whole.97 While an asset-based approach is more
likely than an earnings-based approach to disallow the deduction of interest expenses incurred
by an entity that is more highly leveraged than its group, it may be more generous than an
earnings-based approach for an entity with losses, provided that it is not more highly leveraged
than the group as a whole.98 Although the OECD considers both alternatives consistent with its
best practices approach,99 both the Final Report on BEPS Action 4 and the 2016 Update devote
most of their attention to the design and operation of a group ratio rule using a net third party
interest to EBITDA ratio.100
In order to apply such a rule, it is necessary first to define the group whose net third
party interest to EBITDA ratio must be determined, then to calculate both the net third party
interest expense of this group and the EBITDA of this group (making appropriate adjustments
for exempt income and income that is sheltered from tax by foreign tax credits), and finally to
compare the ratio of the group’s net third party interest to EBITDA to that of the entity (or
domestic group).101 Beginning with the definition of a multinational group, the Report suggests
that “a practical and workable definition of a group is one that is based on a consolidated group
for financial accounting purposes” including “a parent company and all entities which are fully
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consolidated on a line-by-line basis in the parent’s consolidated financial statements.”102 To the
extent that these consolidated financial statements do not include related parties outside the
group, however, the Report recommends either expanding the definition of a group to include
specified related parties or adding a targeted anti-avoidance rule to prevent a group from
inflating its net third party interest to EBITDA ratio by paying interest to a related party outside
the group.103
Likewise with a group’s net third party interest expense and EBITDA, the Report
recommends that the calculation of these amounts can generally be based on figures taken
from a group’s consolidated financial statements,104 though the Report also contemplates
specific adjustments to these amounts to ensure a more accurate picture of the group’s net
third party interest expense and earnings.105 It also suggests that countries may choose to allow
an “uplift” of net third party interest expense of up to 10% in order to “reduce the risk that all
of a group’s actual net third party interest expense is not taken into account”,106 and proposes
special rules to address the impact of loss-making entities on the operation of a group ratio
rule.107
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Although it is impossible for this article to examine each element of the OECD’s group
ratio rule in detail, the rationale for such a rule as a supplement to a fixed ratio rule is sound,
and the OECD’s approach seems to be administratively feasible since consolidated financial
statements are often publicly available and provide relatively reliable information on the
finances of worldwide groups.108 Whether an earnings-based approach is preferable to an
equity escape rule, however, is less clear, particularly to the extent that an earnings-based
approach requires additional rules to address circumstances in which individual entities or
groups have negative EBITDA.109 For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that the Final
Report on BEPS Action 4 acknowledged that no country applied an earnings-based group ratio
rule, while more than one country applied an asset-based rule,110 nor that most countries with
a group ratio rule after BEPS Action 4 apply an equity escape rule rather than an earnings-based
approach.111
Carryover of disallowed interest expense and unused interest capacity
Where net interest expenses of an entity exceed the limit set by a fixed ratio rule, these
expenses may be allowed under a group ratio rule. If a country does not adopt a group ratio
rule or the interest expenses exceed the limit under the group ratio rule, however, the
deduction of these “excessive” interest expenses will be disallowed. In this circumstance, the
Final Report on BEPS Action 4 explains that countries may want to permit disallowed interest
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expenses to be carried over to other taxation years – either forward to subsequent taxation
years or both forward and back to previous taxation years.112 In addition, the Report suggests,
where an entity’s net interest expenses are less than the interest expense that would be
allowed under a fixed ratio or a group ratio, countries may way to allow the carryover of
unused interest capacity that could be used in other taxation years to allow the deduction of
interest expenses exceeding the fixed ratio or group ratio in those years.
Although these carryover provisions would lessen the impact of an earnings-based fixed
ratio rule on entities with relatively volatile earnings, the existence of these rules could create
new BEPS risks since entities with unused interest capacity could be incentivized to increase net
interest expenses or decrease EBITDA in future periods if unused interest capacity can be
carried forward, while a provision allowing entities to carry back disallowed interest expenses
may encourage entities to increase net interest expenses oar decrease EBITDA in a current
taxation year in order to carry disallowed interest expenses back to prior taxation years with
unused interest capacity.113 Carryover provisions also create valuable tax attributes, which
would presumably be subject to restrictions on their use following a change in control of the
entity.114 For these reasons, where carryover provisions are contemplated, these might
reasonably be limited to the carry forward of disallowed interest expenses.
Targeted rules
A final element of the OECD’s proposed best practices approach involves targeted rules
that supplement more general interest limitation rules or prevent the avoidance of these
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general rules.115 Emphasizing that “targeted rules can also provide an effective response to
some base erosion and profit shifting risk”, for example, the Final Report on BEPS Action 4
states that a country may, in addition to a fixed ratio rule, apply a thin capitalization rule based
on a fixed debt to equity ratio in order to disallow interest on excessive debt, and that this rule
could disallow the deduction of interest expenses “even where an entity does not exceed the
level of net interest expense permitted under the fixed ratio rule.”116 As noted earlier, the
Report also recommends a targeted rule to prevent base erosion and profit shifting through
interest payments to related parties and third parties under structured arrangements such as
back-to-back loans.117 It also suggests that countries should adopt anti-avoidance rules to
combat arrangements designed to reduce an entity’s net interest expense such as converting
interest expense into a different form of deductible expense or converting other taxable
income into a form which is economically equivalent to interest.118
Implementation of Best Practices in Other Countries
In the years since the Final Report on BEPS Action 4 was released in 2015, several
jurisdictions around the world have moved to implement key elements of the OECD’s best
practices approach. In 2016, for example, the European Union adopted an Anti Tax Avoidance
Directive (ATAD), requiring member states to implement a number of anti tax avoidance
provisions, including an interest limitation rule based on the recommendations of BEPS Action
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4, in most cases no later than January 1, 2019.119 According to Article 4 of this Directive, the
interest limitation rule should include the following elements:
(1) a fixed ratio rule limiting the deduction of net interest expenses exceeding
30% of a taxpayer’s EBITDA less tax-exempt income;
(2) a monetary threshold of €3 million and exemptions for standalone entities
and loans used to fund long-term public infrastructure projects where the
project operator, borrowing costs, assets and income are all in the European
Union;
(3) a group ratio rule allowing a taxpayer that is a member of a consolidated
group for financial accounting purposes to deduct net interest expenses
exceeding the fixed ratio either (a) where the ratio of the taxpayer’s equity to its
assets is at least 2% less than the equity to asset ratio of the group or (b) where
the ratio of the taxpayer’s net interest to EBITDA is no greater than the net
interest to EBITDA ratio of the group; and
(4) either an unlimited carry forward of disallowed interest expense, an
unlimited carry forward and a three-year carry back of disallowed interest
expense, or an unlimited carry forward of disallowed interest expense and a fiveyear carry forward of unused interest capacity.120
In accordance with this Directive, most EU member states (including the United
Kingdom for now) have either retained or adopted interest limitation rules with an earningsbased fixed ratio set at 30% of the taxpayer’s net interest expense to EBITDA less tax-exempt
income.121 Several have also retained or introduced a group ratio rule permitting the deduction
of interest expenses above the fixed ratio, although most of these rules take the form of an
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assets-based equity escape rule, rather than an earnings-based rule.122 As well, most EU
member states permit an unlimited carry forward of disallowed interest expense and many also
allow a five-year carry forward of unused interest capacity.123 Finally, most EU member states
have also adopted a de minimis monetary threshold of €3 million or an equivalent amount in
domestic currency.124
Outside the EU, however, countries appear to have been much slower to implement the
recommendations of BEPS Action 4, though at least eight countries have retained or introduced
an earnings-based fixed ratio rule consistent with the OECD’s best practices approach.125 Most
significantly for Canada, moreover, the United States amended its existing earnings-stripping
rule effective January 1, 2018, adopting an earnings-based fixed ratio rule that limits a
taxpayer’s deduction of net interest expenses to 30% if its adjusted taxable income, which is
based on EBITDA for taxation years beginning before 2022 and EBIT for subsequent taxation
years.126 Although this provision allows an unlimited carry forward of disallowed interest
expense,127 it does not include a group ratio rule and provides no carry over for unused interest
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capacity. Nor does it include a general monetary threshold, though it exempts small businesses
with average gross receipts of $25 million or less over the previous three years.128
Whither Canada?
As explained earlier in this article, although Canada has several rules that limit the
deduction of interest expenses for international tax planning, its thin capitalization rules are
deficient in several respects,129 and it has failed to adopt any general limitation on the
deduction of interest expenses on borrowed money used to produce exempt dividends from
foreign affiliates – notwithstanding recommendations to this effect dating back to the 1990s
and limitations proposed in the 2007 Federal Budget.130 As the Advisory Panel on Canada’s
System of International Taxation emphasized in 2008, the main reason to reject more robust
limits on the deduction of interest expenses is not theoretical, but a pragmatic concern about
international competitiveness in an environment in which other countries do not apply such
limits on the deduction of interest expenses for international tax planning.131 A key objective of
BEPS Action 4 was to address this collective action by promoting “a consistent approach
utilising international best practices”132 -- towards which it expects domestic rules to
converge.133
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Although it is fair to conclude that implementation of the recommendations in BEPS
Action 4 is, as a recent report concludes, “very much ongoing”,134 it is notable that most EU
member states have adopted a version of the OECD’s best practices approach including in
particular an earnings-based fixed ratio rule, and that the United States and several other
countries have also introduced earnings-based fixed ratio rules consistent with the main
recommendation of BEPS Action 4.135 At the same time, corporate rate reductions in the United
States and the United Kingdom have increased the risk of profit shifting out of Canada.136 In this
changed international environment, it is time for Canada to revisit its rules for the deduction of
interest expenses, having regard to the best practices in BEPS Action 4 and the implementation
of interest limitation rules in EU member states and the United States.
To this end, Canada should start with an earnings-based fixed ratio rule consistent with
the rules adopted by EU member states and the United States, limiting a taxpayer’s net interest
expenses to 30% of its EBITDA less exempt dividends from foreign affiliates. However deficient
EBITDA may be as a reliable and consistent measure of an entity’s earnings and however crude
a 30% ratio is as a benchmark for limiting the deduction of interest expenses, this approach has
clearly become the norm in many countries and would address at least some of the deficiencies
in Canada’s thin capitalization rules and impose a valuable limit on the deduction of interest on
borrowed money that is used to finance outbound investments producing exempt dividends.
Although one might expect this 30% ratio to decrease over time as these rules become more
common, particularly if they are combined with a group ratio rule providing relief for interest
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expenses exceeding the fixed ratio, there is no reason why Canada should adopt a lower ratio
than other countries, particularly when Canada has had no prior experience with an earningsbased fixed ratio rule.
Consistent with the best practices approach in BEPS Action 4, this fixed ratio rule should
at a minimum apply to entities that are members of a multinational group, which as an initial
matter may be defined either on the basis of direct and indirect control or according to
consolidated financial statements.137 As with Canada’s thin capitalization rules, however, which
apply at a lower threshold of ownership, these definitions might be expanded In order to limit
opportunities for avoidance through payments to related parties that are not members of the
multinational group. Also like Canada’s thin capitalization rules, the rule should presumably also
apply to interest payments by trusts and partnerships, as well as non-residents carrying on
business in Canada.
Also consistent with the best practices approach, the rule should probably include a
monetary threshold and an exemption for long-term public infrastructure projects. Although a
monetary threshold would have to be applied at the level of a domestic group or accompanied
by anti-fragmentation rules in order to prevent abuse,138 such a threshold could reduce
administrative and compliance costs for small- and medium-sized enterprises for which the
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risks of BEPS are likely less than they are for larger MNEs. In addition, as explained earlier, most
EU member states have also adopted a de minimis monetary threshold of €3 million or an
equivalent amount in domestic currency,139 and the United States exempts small businesses
with average gross receipts of $25 million or less over the previous three years.140 An
exemption for long-term public infrastructure is incorporated into Article 4 of the EU ATAD and
is generally justified on the grounds these projects involve little or no risk of BEPS.
Whether Canada should also adopt a group ratio rule, however, is much less certain.
Although a group ratio rule has a more principled rationale than a fixed ratio rule, such a rule
would add another layer of complexity to what would already be a novel set of rules, and could
be difficult to administer even with financial information available from consolidated financial
statements. As well, the need for a supplementary group ratio rule is reduced if the fixed ratio
rule adopts a relatively high ratio like 30%, which is a the top of the OECD’s suggested range.
For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that neither the United States nor many EU
member states have opted to enact a group ratio rule in addition to their earnings-based fixed
ratio rules. For all these reasons, Canada might reasonably defer the introduction of any group
ratio rule in order to benefit from other countries’ experience and until such time as a fixed
ratio is reduced. If and when Canada does adopt a group ratio rule, it should also consider
whether an equity escape rule would be less complex and easier to explain than an earningsbased approach.
Without a group ratio rule, of course, taxpayers whose net interest expenses exceed the
fixed ratio will not be able to deduct these expenses even if their net interest to EBITDA ratio is
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less than that of the worldwide group or their equity to asset ratio equals or exceeds that of the
worldwide group. Where the fixed ratio is based on net interest expenses to EBITDA, this is a
particular concern for entities with volatile earnings, which may have negative EBITDA, resulting
in the disallowance of all net interest expenses. In this case, it is arguable that a fixed ratio rule
should be accompanied by relatively generous carryovers for disallowed interest expense and
unused interest capacity. On the other hand, as explained earlier, these carryovers can create
new BEPS risks since entities with unused interest capacity that can be carried forward could be
encouraged to increase net interest expenses or decrease EBITDA in future years, and entities
with disallowed interest expenses that can be carried back may be encouraged to increase net
interest expenses or decrease EBITDA in the current taxation year order to utilize unused
interest capacity in previous years.141 As well, carryover provisions create valuable tax
attributes that must be subject to anti-avoidance rules preventing their transfer to other
taxpayers, adding to complexity.
Although most EU member states appear to have adopted relatively generous carryover
provisions for disallowed interest expenses and unused interest capacity, the United States and
most other non-EU countries have introduced more limited carryover provisions allowing only
the carry forward of disallowed interest expenses without any time limit.142 Considering the
potential problems associated with more generous carryover provisions, Canada would be wise
to limit any carryovers to the carry forward of disallowed interest expenses – which, as in the
United States and many other countries might reasonably be without any time limit. If this form
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of relief is considered inadequate, it would be better to reconsider a group ratio rule than more
generous carryover provisions.
A further question concerns the status of existing rules restricting the deduction of
interest expenses for international tax planning, specifically the thin capitalization rules and the
foreign affiliate dumping rules. Although it might be argued that these rules would be
unnecessary if Canada were to adopt a more general rule limiting the deduction of interest
expenses, these rules also serve other purposes – effectively re-characterizing debt as equity
(and interest payments as dividends) in the case of the thin capitalization rules and preventing
surplus-stripping in the case of the foreign affiliate dumping rules. As well, the best practices
approach in BEPS Action 4 includes targeted anti-avoidance rules in addition to more general
rules limiting the deduction of interest expenses. For these reasons, it would be best for Canada
to retain these rules.
Finally, since a more general limitation on the deduction of interest expenses in the
international context will presumably increase government revenues, some thought should be
given to accompanying measures that might enhance Canada’s international tax
competitiveness, particularly in an environment where other countries, particularly the United
States, have significantly reduced their corporate tax rates largely eliminating what had been a
significant tax advantage for Canada. Short of more fundamental reforms that would require a
more comprehensive review of Canada’s tax system,143 these measures might reasonably
include phased reductions in the federal corporate tax rate that would lessen the risk of profit-
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shifting out of Canada and incentivize future investment in Canada without creating significant
windfall gains for existing investments.
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